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Abstract 
On 9 December 2014, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment 
Act 2014 amended the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 by 
removing the requirement for an intelligence or visual surveillance warrant in some 
situations of emergency or urgency. The warrant process is the primary mechanism 
for the purpose of ensuring surveillance powers are not exercised arbitrarily or 
unreasonably. Any departure from this process must be justified, limited and 
proportionate. After a brief look at the history of the Bill, this paper will then consider 
the circumstances in which a warrantless authorisation shall be granted and 
information retained, with reference to the trigger concepts of "terrorist act", "foreign 
terrorist fighter" and "security". Amendments proposed include limiting the grounds 
for warrantless surveillance and information retention to countering "foreign terrorist 
fighters".  It will then discuss the consistency of the Bill with the New Zealand's Bill 
of Rights Act, focussing on the authorisation structure and length. It will put forward 
an amendment that restructures the power such that authorisation for surveillance in 
urgency will be provided by the Minister and Commissioner within 12 hours.  
 
Key words: warrantless, surveillance, counterterrorism, New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service, Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
I Introduction 
 
The traditional divide between domestic and foreign threats has been eroded with 
global trends in international migration and expanded use of the Internet, rapidly 
pluralizing and dispersing the menace posed by foreign terrorist fighters and other 
violent extremists.1 The most recent manifestation of the foreign terrorist threat is the 
rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, who are responsible for widespread use of 
indiscriminate and extreme violence primarily in Iraq and Syria. More than 25,000 
foreign terrorist fighters are associated with ISIL, of which an estimated 3,000 hold 
western passports.2 The threat of radicalised foreign fighters causing mass casualties 
is conducive to anticipatory and preventative counterterrorism measures. An 
inevitable consequence of this risk dynamic is an intelligence-led approach in which 
surveillance is conducted on a wide and prescient scale.3  
New Zealand's Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill ("the Bill") was 
introduced to the House under urgency on 25 November 2014. It amended three 
statutes in order to restrict and disrupt travel, monitor and investigate foreign terrorist 
fighters. 4  The Committee divided the Bill into the Passports Amendment Bill, 
Customs and Excise Amendment Bill, and New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
Amendment Bill pursuant to Supplementary Order Paper 39.5 On 9 December 2014, 
the amendments became law following a 94-27 party vote in the House. 6 The New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Amendment Act 2014 thereby amended the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 by removing the requirement for an 
                                                        
1 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Special Report to Parliament: Checks and Controls: 
Reinforcing Privacy Protection and Oversight for the Canadian Intelligence Community in an Era of 
Cyber-Surveillance (28 January 2014) at 2.  
2 Most recent statement on the number of foreign terrorist fighters associated with ISIL found at UN 
News Centre "At Debate, UN and Security Council renew pledge to counter foreign terrorist fighters" 
(29 May 2015) United Nations <www.un.org>. Numbers of western passports from Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet Regulatory Impact Statement: Foreign Terrorist Fighters – Targeted 
review of relevant legislation (12 November 2014) at 2[2].  
3 Clive Walker "Keeping Control of Terrorists without Losing Control of Constitutionalism" (2007) 59 
Stan L Rev 1395 at 1396.  
4 Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill 2014 (1-2) (select committee report) at 1.  
5 Amendments other than ss 4ID and 4IE of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 
lie outside the scope of this paper.  
6 (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 1207.  
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intelligence or visual surveillance warrant in some situations of emergency or 
urgency.7  
The warrant process is the primary mechanism for the purpose of ensuring 
surveillance powers are not exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Any departure from 
this process must be justified, limited and proportionate. 8  This paper does not 
consider whether warrantless surveillance in situations of emergency or urgency is a 
justifiable extension of powers to the security intelligence service. Rather, it will 
examine the breadth and duration of the power as enacted in the light of the principle 
of legality and human rights. In making this analysis, this paper seeks to determine 
whether the scope of the current power is proportionate to the foreign terrorist fighter 
threat, and put forward possible amendments that will circumscribe the overzealous 
enactment.   
After a brief look at the history of the Bill, this paper will then consider the 
circumstances in which a warrantless authorisation shall be granted and information 
retained, with reference to the trigger concepts of "terrorist act", "foreign terrorist 
fighter" and "security". It will then discuss the consistency of the Bill with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, focusing on the authorisation approval structure and 
period of validity. A few concluding remarks will close the paper.  
 
II Impetus for the Amendment 
 
Spurred by the rise of ISIL, shortly after the 2014 election Cabinet agreed to a 
targeted review of capacity, capability and legislation to ensure they are adequate to 
respond to the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremism both 
locally and internationally.9 The focus of the review was interim measures to be taken 
                                                        
7 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 ("NZSIS Act"), s 4ID. 
8 Privacy Commissioner "Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the 
Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill" at 3.  
9 John Key, Prime Minister of New Zealand "Speech to New Zealand Institute of International Affairs" 
(media release, 5 November 2014); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 2, at 1[2]. 
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in advance of the comprehensive review of legislative required to commence before 
30 June 2015.10 The Bill was the result of the targeted review's recommendations.11  
 
The review and provisions are in part a reflection of New Zealand's international 
obligation to comply with United Nations Security Resolution 2178 as enacted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.12 This Resolution expressed grave 
concern over the "acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters".13 The 
Resolution reaffirmed that all States shall prevent the movement of terrorists by 
effective border controls; intensify international information sharing and cooperation; 
and to make efforts to prevent radicalization, recruitment, financial support and 
operation of foreign fighters.14 It leaves to states the responsibility of deciding what 
legislation is necessary to achieve these goals, consistent with international human 
rights, humanitarian principles, and refugee law. 15  Perhaps surveillance is the 
necessary foundation for practical implementation of these measures, but it is notable 
that the Resolution does not expressly encourage the expansion of state surveillance 
powers. Furthermore, it was stated by a member of the Select Committee on the Bill 
that New Zealand's law before amendment complied with Resolution 2178.16 As a 
result, the Resolution does not provide a solid foundation upon which to enact 
overzealous legislation.17 
 
In October 2014, New Zealand's domestic threat level was raised from very low to 
low, indicating that a terrorist attack is possible, but not expected.18 Government 
agencies have identified 30 to 40 people of concern, and another 30 to 40 individuals 
requiring further investigation in a number of centres around New Zealand.19  In April 
2015, the Director of Security stated that these individuals are involved in a range of 
activities, including inciting radicalism, funding or facilitating travel for foreign                                                         
10 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 2, at 1[2]. 
11 Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill 2014 (1-2) (select committee report) at 1. 
12 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 2, at 1; Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation 
Bill 2014 (1-2) (select committee report) at 2. 
13 SC Res 2178, S/Res/2178 (2014) preamble at 2.   
14 Preamble at 4.  
15 Kennedy Graham (Green Party) speaking during the Second Reading (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 
1207.   
16 Fletcher Tabuteau (New Zealand First) speaking In Committee (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 1207.  
17 Kennedy Graham, above n 15.   
18 Prime Minister John Key (Press release, 13 October 2014). 
19 Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill 2014 (1-2) (select committee report) at 2. 
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fighters, foreign fighters who have already travelled to the Middle East, and people 
actively planning attacks in New Zealand.20 For the year ending 30 June 2014, the 
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service ("NZSIS") advised on the cancellation of 
passports of some monitored individuals intending to travel to Syria, finding that there 
is a "real likelihood" the lives of those individuals have been saved, and "had these 
individuals managed to get to Syria and fight, the NZSIS has prevented the risk of 
battle-hardened individuals returning and compromising New Zealand's security."21  
 
Notwithstanding, the targeted review found that urgent situations may arise and, 
despite processes to expedite warrant application and issuance, the number of hours 
required for a warrant to be issued may risk the loss of vital intelligence and failure to 
cancel an individual's passport before they leave New Zealand. 22  The review, 
therefore, supported a power of emergency authorisation issued by the Director of 
Security. 23  It is worthy of note that the review does not refer to an actual situation in 
which delay inherent in the warrant process has resulted in adverse effects. When 
introducing the Bill, Hon Christopher Finlayson spoke to a "hypothetical situation" in 
which the warrantless powers "could" be required.24 This suggests that the current 
warrant system has served the purpose of monitoring and investigating foreign 
terrorist fighters aptly. To illustrate, the NZSIS's first interim report on the use of 
authorisations for the period 12 – 31 December 2014 stated that no authorisations had 
been made.25  
 
Finally, the review draws parallels with the similar regime for surveillance without a 
warrant in situations of emergency or urgency in the Search and Surveillance Act 
2012 available to law enforcement authorities,26 which narrowly became law after 
passing 61 votes to 57.27                                                          
20 Interview with Rebecca Kitteridge, Director of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (Brent 
Edwards, Insight, Radio New Zealand, 19 April 2015).  
21 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Annual Report: For the year ended 30 June 2014 (G 35, 
23 March 2015) at 10.  
22 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 2, at [18].  
23 At [20] – [21].  
24 Christopher Finlayson (National Party) speaking during the First Reading (25 November 2015) 702 
NZPD 781.  
25 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Section 4ID Authorisations Interim Report for the period 
1 July 2014 to 31 December 2014 (2 March 2015) at 4.  
26 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 2, at [19].  
27 (22 March 2012) 678 NZPD 1245.  
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The Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill passed through Parliament under 
urgency. Two days were allowed for public submission; nearly 600 submissions were 
received, 23 of which were heard.28 The Bill received support at every stage by the 
National, ACT and United Future parties (62 seats). The Green Party, New Zealand 
First and the Maori Party opposed it at every stage (27 seats). Labour (32 seats) 
initially did not support the amendments, but gave an affirmative vote after the Select 
Committee process.29  
 
III  Statutory Requirements for Legal Authority to Undertake 
Surveillance  
 
This part will outline the statutory requirements for the issuance of a warrant, then 
compare these requirements with those for the issuance of an authorisation by the 
Director. It will then consider the oversight mechanisms for authorisations, and 
canvas the emergency warrant procedures of other key Commonwealth jurisdictions.   
 
A Pre-Amendment Powers of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service  
 
The NZSIS was established under the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
Act 1969. Its statutory functions are to "obtain, correlate and evaluate intelligence 
relevant to security" and "communicate any such intelligence to such persons, and 
in such manner, as the Director considers to be in the interests of security."30  
 
Prior to the Bill, there was no avenue through which the NZSIS could legally 
undertake warrantless surveillance. Interception or seizure of any communication, 
document or thing not otherwise lawfully obtainable, or the undertaking of 
electronic tracking, had to be authorised by a warrant jointly issued by the Minister 
in charge of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Commissioner 
                                                        
28 Kennedy Graham, above n 15.   
29 Andrew Little (Labour Party) speaking during the Second Reading (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 
1207.  
30 NZSIS Act, s 4(1)(a).  
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of Security Warrants.31 The Commissioner of Security Warrants is an individual 
who has previously held office as a High Court Judge.32 A domestic intelligence 
warrant would be issued where the Minister and Commissioner were satisfied that: 
(a) the proposed interception, seizure or electronic tracking is "necessary for the 
detection of activities prejudicial to security"; and (b) the value of the information 
sought justified the particular activities; and (c) "the information is not likely to be 
obtained by any other means"; and (d) any communications sought to be 
intercepted or seized is not privileged in court proceedings.33 
 
The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security operates the oversight scheme 
for the warrant process. Their role is to review the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of procedures adopted by intelligence agencies to ensure 
compliance with the statutory provisions relating to the issue and execution of 
warrants.34 Reports are published annually canvassing the year ending 30 June.35 In 
2014, the Inspector-General initiated an own-motion inquiry into actions 
undertaken by the NZSIS and Prime Minister's Office in 2011. Arising from 
regular inspection of security warrants, this was the first Inspector-General inquiry 
into the propriety of particular activities of an intelligence and security agency.36  
 
On 25 November 2015, the Inspector-General released her report. 37 The report 
found that the NZSIS had disclosed incomplete, inaccurate and misleading 
information; failed to provide clarification once these errors had become apparent; 
made significant errors in handling media information and OIA. 38  The report 
further established that the NZSIS did not have appropriate processes and protocols 
for the maintenance of political neutrality in its relationship with the Prime 
Minister's Office; failed to maintain a relationship of trust and confidence with the 
Leader of the Opposition; and undertook an insufficiently rigorous and careful                                                         
31 NZSIS Act, s 4A(1).  
32 Section 5A(3).  
33 Section 4A(3).  
34 Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996, s 11(d)(i).  
35 Section 27(1).  
36 Cheryl Gwyn Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2014 (Office of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security, 17 February 2015) at 12.  
37 Cheryl Gwyn Report into the release of information by the New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service in July and August 2011 (Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 25 
November 2014). 
38 At [9] – [12].  
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approach to security intelligence.39 In what seems extremely inopportune timing, 
the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill was introduced to the House the 
very day this report was released, thereby accompanying proposed extension of 
intrusive state powers with a weak political foundation and corroded public trust.40  
 
 
B The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 2014 
 
On 12 December 2014, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Amendment Act came 
into force.41 It provided two new powers to the NZSIS: warranted visual surveillance 
powers to detect, investigate or prevent any actual, potential, or suspected terrorist act 
or facilitation of a terrorist act; and "authorisations" for warrantless surveillance in 
situations of emergency or urgency.42 
 
1 Section 4ID: warrants need not be obtained in some situations of emergency 
or urgency   
 
Under the amended Act, an intelligence warrant or visual surveillance warrant need 
not be obtained in some situations of emergency or urgency.43 The Director of the 
NZSIS may authorise a person to undertake surveillance without a warrant where the 
power is necessary "for the detection, investigation or prevention of any actual, 
potential or suspected terrorist act or facilitation of a terrorist act", the Director is 
satisfied that the threshold for issuing a warrant is met, and obtaining a warrant is 
impracticable in the circumstances and a delay is likely to result in a loss of 
intelligence. 44  An authorisation allows the interception or seizure of any 
communication, document or thing, electronic tracking, or visual surveillance.45 The 
                                                        
39 Cheryl Gwyn, above n 37, at [14] – [21].   
40 Kennedy Graham, above n 15.  
41New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 2014.  
42 Section 4.  
43 NZSIS Act, s 4ID. 
44 Section 4ID(1).  
45 Section 4ID(2).  
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authorisation is valid for a period of 24 hours.46 Upon expiry, no further application 
may be made for an authorisation in respect of the same subject matter.47  
 
Table 1 compares the statutory requirements for issue of a warrant with authorisations 
granted in situations of urgency or emergency. 48 Firstly, warrants and authorisations 
allow undertaking of the same modes and level of surveillance.49 Secondly, warrants 
are approved jointly by the Minister in charge of the NZSIS and the Commissioner of 
Security Warrants upon application by the Director, whereas the Director issues 
authorisations.50 As a result, surveillance under authorisation is approved internally. 
Thirdly, intelligence warrants are provided on grounds prejudicial to "security", 
whereas visual surveillance and authorisations may be made only in respect of a 
terrorist act or facilitation thereof.51 Thus, authorisations are granted on more limited 
grounds than a warrant. Fourthly, in addition to satisfaction that grounds for a warrant 
are fulfilled, authorisations additionally require that obtaining a warrant is 
impracticable and is likely to result in loss of intelligence.52 Finally, warrants may be 
valid for a period up to 12 months and may be renewed in respect of the same subject 
matter.53 Authorisations are valid for a period of 24 hours, and may not be renewed 
unless a warrant is granted in respect of that subject matter.54  
 
2 Section 4IE: oversight after an authorisation has been issued  
 
Section 4IE contains an oversight scheme operating after an authorisation has been 
issued. Immediately after an authorisation is given, the Director must advise the 
Minister, the Inspector-General and, where appropriate, the Commissioner. 55 The 
Minister or the Commissioner may direct the NZSIS to discontinue activity under the 
authorisation and destroy any information collected without delay.56 If the Minister or 
Commissioner makes such a direction, the Director must refer the matter to the                                                         
46 NZSIS Act, s 4ID(3). 
47 Section 4ID(4).  
48 See Appendix. 
49 NZSIS Act, ss 4A(1), 4IB(1) and 4ID(2). 
50 Sections 4A(1) and 4A(4), 4IB(1) and 4IB(5) and s 4ID(1). 
51 Sections 4A(3)(a), 4IB(3)(a) and 4ID(1)(a).   
52 Section 4ID(1)(c).  
53 Sections 4C and 4IC(1)(c).  
54 Sections 4ID(3) and 4ID(4).  
55 Section 41E(1). 
56 Section 41E(2). 
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Inspector-General for investigation.57 It is the responsibility of the Director to ensure 
that any directions are carried out without delay.58  
 
After expiry of an authorisation, if no application has been made for a warrant, the 
Director must provide a report to the Minister or, where appropriate, the 
Commissioner, including reasons the authorisation was given, no application for a 
warrant was made and the nature of the information collected under the 
authorisation. 59  The Minister or Commissioner must determine whether it was 
appropriate for that authorisation to have been given, and refer the matter to the 
Inspector-General for investigation.60 If an authorisation is followed by a warrant 
application that is refused, the Director must refer the matter to the Inspector-General 
for investigation.61  
 
If no warrant is issued in relation to the authorisation, the Minister must ensure that 
any records are destroyed except information that may be prejudicial to security.62 
The decision to retain records must be referred to the Inspector-General for 
investigation.63 The breadth of this retention clause raises questions because it allows 
information to be retained on grounds wider than that for which it was authorised to 
be collected, and will be considered in more depth in Part III.  
 
Evidently, the Inspector-General operates the integral oversight mechanism for the 
exercise of authorisation powers. However, debate in the House raised concerns 
regarding the statutory political neutrality, independence and powers of the Inspector-
General to ensure intelligence and security agencies comply with the law, given the 
advisory role of the office.64 The powers and role of the Inspector-General are to be 
reviewed in the wider intelligence and security community review this year.65                                                          
57 NZSIS Act, s 41E(4). 
58 Section 4IE(3).  
59 Sections 41E(5)-(6).  
60 Section 4IE(7). 
61 Section 41E(8). 
62 Section 4IE(9).  
63 Section 41E(10). 
64 Phil Goff, (Labour Party) and David Shearer (Labour Party) speaking In Committee (9 December 
2014) 702 NZPD 1207.  
65 Christopher Finlayson (National Party) speaking In Committee (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 1207. 
There has been no further information as to the state of the review released to the public as of August 
2015.  
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Sections 4IE(12), 4IE(13) and 4IE(14) impose interim six-monthly and annual 
reporting requirements to be prepared by the Director to be delivered to the 
Minister.66 The Bill contains a sunset clause set to expire on 1 April 2017.67  
 
3 Use of information and possible redress for individuals subject to improper 
surveillance  
 
Information gained or the existence of a warrant may not be disclosed otherwise than 
in the strict course of official duties or as authorised by the Minister.68   While the Act 
does not expressly provide that intelligence may be used as evidence, it is difficult to 
conceive of any other purpose for the collection of intelligence, and there are 
Canadian and Australian precedents that assume this is the case.69 Interesting legal 
questions also arise as to whether warrantless surveillance is admissible in court if a 
subsequent warrant is not sought, or denied.70   
 
The rights of an individual subjected to improper surveillance are not set out in the 
enactment. In the security intelligence context, the challenge in gaining access to 
judicial review or successfully filing a complaint with the Inspector-General, 
Ombudsman or Privacy Commissioner is that individuals are required to be aware of 
the surveillance. Comments about security organisations generally note that such 
awareness is precluded by the clandestine nature of the surveillance programmes and, 
as a result, individuals may not have a legal avenue for redress. 71 Where police 
overstep their powers in the course of criminal investigation, that activity will be 
tested in court. By contrast, security organisations face the prospect of accountability 
                                                        
66 NZSIS Act, s 41E(12) – (14).  
67Section 41G.  
68 Section 12A.  
69 Roger Douglas Law, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorism (The University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, 2014) at 71 citing cases: Parkin v O'Sullivan [2006] FCA 1413; (2006) 162 FCR 444; 
Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 SCC 38; [2008] 2 SCR 326.  
70 Kennedy Graham (Green Party) speaking during the First Reading (25 November 2014) 702 NZPD 
781.  
71Martin Scheinin Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism A/HRC/13/37 (28 December 2009) at [38].  
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only where oversight mechanisms raise an issue, or information morph into criminal 
proceedings.72  
 
As an illustration of the situation in New Zealand, in the past five years the Inspector-
General has recorded only a handful of errors and complaints, none of which resulted 
in compensation. Three complaints relating to harassment and surveillance have been 
made, none of which were upheld.73 Corrective action following two errors in 2010 
meant that "[n]o apparent harm to anyone had followed". 74  Similarly in 2014, 
information collected from inadvertent surveillance of a third party was deleted and 
no further action was determined as necessary.75  
 
4 Other Commonwealth jurisdictions 
 
It is important to understand how New Zealand's amendments compare with the 
legislation of other Commonwealth countries. At the request of the Select Committee, 
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet released a statement comparing 
provisions of the Bill with the legal standards in Australia and the United Kingdom.76   
 
The legislative foundation in Australia for urgent surveillance is the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 s 29. The statement represented that the 
Director-General of the ASIO may issue emergency warrants where the Director is 
satisfied of "reasonable grounds for believing" that the surveillance will substantially 
assist the collection of intelligence relation to security.77 On its face, this is correct, 
but the statement did not mention the integral paragraph 29(1)(a). This provision 
requires that the Director-General may issue a warrant where "the Director-General 
                                                        
72 Craig Forcese and Kent Roach "Bill c51: the Good, the Bad… and the Truly Ugly" (13 February 
2015) <thewalrus.ca>. 
73 D P Neazor Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2011 (Office of the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 11 October 2011) at [8]; D P Neazor Inspector-General 
of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2012 (Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security, November 2012) at [10.d].  
74 D P Neazor, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2010 (Office of the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 16 November 2010) at [31]. 
75 Cheryl Gwyn, above n 36, at 21. 
76 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill – 
Comparison with other jurisdictions (28 November 2014).  
77 At [5].  
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has forwarded or made a request to the Minister for the issue of a warrant".78 The 
operation of this paragraph is to dictate that surveillance may only be authorised by 
the Director-General after a warrant has been applied for. Emergency warrants are 
valid for a period not exceeding 48 hours.79  
 
New Zealand's emergency authorisations are granted in more limited, 
counterterrorism circumstances than Australian emergency warrants. New Zealand's 
authorisations also extend for half the period of Australia's emergency warrants. 
However, Australian emergency warrants may only be issued where a warrant 
application has already been made to the Minister. This suggests that the Australian 
security services do not consider the time to collate evidence for a warrant a 
disproportionate threat to their ability to collect vital information.  
 
The statement then references the Security Service Act 1989 s 3(b) as the legislative 
foundation for the United Kingdom MI5's power to undertake urgent surveillance.80 
However, this section of the Act was repealed and superseded in 1994.81 The current 
legislative provisions for urgent surveillance conducted by MI5 is the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. A warrant will be granted in circumstances of 
national security, for the detection or prevention of serious crime, and for 
safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. 82  Warrants for 
interception of communication and intrusive surveillance in an urgent case will only 
be issued where the Secretary of State has expressly authorised it issue.83 An urgent 
interception warrant will last for a period of five working days.84  
 
The United Kingdom's emergency powers are granted in considerably wider 
circumstances and are valid for a significantly longer period than New Zealand's 
emergency authorisations. However, the United Kingdom's urgency provision 
requires the Secretary of State (for these purposes, the actor equivalent to New 
Zealand's Minister and Commissioner) to personally authorise the warrant. This is                                                         
78 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Aus), s 29(1)(a).  
79 Section 29(2). 
80 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 76, at [10].  
81 Security Service Act 1989 (UK), s 3(b).  
82 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), s 5(3).  
83 Sections 7(2)(a) (interception of communications); 42(1) and 44(2) (intrusive surveillance). 
84 Section 9(6)(a). 
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strictly contrasted with New Zealand's legislation that requires notification of the 
Minister and Commissioner whom have a power to discontinue the surveillance, but 
do not positively authorise it until a warrant has been issued.85  
 
Though not referred to in the departmental report, the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service has no statutory authority to undertake warrantless surveillance. Under s 
21(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984, if a warrant is required 
for investigation of a threat to security, applications are made to a Federal Court judge 
after having obtained the Minister's approval.86  
 
 
IV  Warrantless Surveillance: Necessary, Justified and 
Proportionate? 
 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated 
that:87   
Terrorism aims at the very destruction of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law. It attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations and 
other international instruments: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules 
governing armed conflict and the protection of civilians; tolerance among peoples 
and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict.  
The flip side is that "measures to combat terrorism may also prejudice the enjoyment 
of – or may violate – human rights and the rule of law." 88  As a result, 
counterterrorism best practice requires that the exercise of functions and powers be 
based on the principle of legality and that restrictions on rights shall be proportionate 
to the benefit obtained.89 For example, a recommendation to New Zealand following 
its second Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations Human Rights Council                                                         
85 NZSIS Act, s 4IE(2).  
86 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985 (Can), s 21(1). 
87 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact Sheet No 32: Human 
Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism (July 2008) at 7.  
88Martin Scheinin Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism A/HRC/16/51 (22 December 2010) at [8].  
89 At [15]-[16].  
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was to ensure that legislation on surveillance complies with the principle of 
proportionality, and that its counterterrorism legislation is in full compliance with the 
ICCPR.90 
 
A Principle of Legality 
Respect for the rule of the law means that the principle of legality cannot be 
compromised. 91  This principle is enshrined in Article 15 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and is non-derogable, even in times 
of public emergency.92 It is implicit in this principle that laws contain clear and 
precise provisions, so as to ensure that the law is not subject to interpretation that 
would unduly broaden the scope of the proscribed conduct. 93  Following 
investigation in Chile, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has recently 
recommended that "in particular, the definitions of terrorist crimes should be 
confined exclusively to activities that entail or are directly related to the use of 
deadly or serious violence against civilians".94  
Applied to the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, the principle of 
legality requires that the Acts provisions are formulated in explicit, precise and 
confined terms such that an individual may be reasonably aware when their 
behaviour will subject them to warrantless surveillance. The trigger concept of the 
warrantless surveillance power is that of "terrorist act".95  
 
1 Definition of "terrorist act"  
The definition of "terrorist act" is contained in s 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002. The term encompasses acts that constitute an offense as defined in a specified                                                         
90United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: New Zealand A/HRC/26/3 (7 April 2014) at [218.154]-[218.155].  
91 Kim Lane Scheppele "Global Security law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism after 9/11" (2011) 
2 PL 354 at 365.  
92  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), art 15 ("ICCPR").  
93 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 87, at 40.   
94 Ben Emmerson Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism A/HRC/25/59/Add.2 (11 March 2014) at [93]. 
95NZSIS Act, s 4ID(1)(a).  
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terrorism convention; 96 or acts that are carried out "for the purpose of advancing an 
ideological, political, or religious cause" that intend to induce terror in a civilian 
population or unduly compel a government or international organisation to do or 
abstain from doing any act.97 Acts of the latter type also require a harm element, such 
that the act must be intended to cause: 98  
• Death or serious bodily injury; or 
• "serious risk to health or safety of a population"; or  
• serious interference or disruption to an infrastructure facility, "if likely to 
endanger human life"; or 
• "destruction of, or serious damage to property of great value or importance, 
major economic loss, or major environmental damage" if likely to result in the 
aforementioned outcomes; or 
• "introduction or release of a disease-bearing organism, if likely to devastate 
the national economy of a country". 
Section 25(1) of the Act lengthily extends the definition into the inchoate period by 
legislating that a terrorist act is carried out where planning or preparations to carry out 
the act, whether it is carried out or not; a credible threat to carry out the act; an 
attempt to carry out the act; or the actual carrying out of the act.99 A terrorist act is 
facilitated if there is knowledge that a terrorist act is being facilitated, but this does 
not require that the facilitator knows specifically that any act is foreseen or planned, 
or that the act is ultimately carried out.100 The definition contains an avoidance of 
doubt safeguard stating that "the fact that a person engaged in any protest, advocacy, 
or dissent, or engaged in any strike, lockout or other industrial action" alone is not 
sufficient basis for inferring the requisite purpose or intention.101 
The definition has been criticised by the New Zealand Human Rights Commission as 
"open to interpretation" with the potential to be "applied very broadly by law                                                         
96 Terrorism Suppression Act, sch 3: unlawful seizure of aircraft, civil aviation, international crimes, 
taking of hostages, maritime navigation, fixed platforms, bombings, nuclear material and nuclear 
terrorism. 
97 Terrorism Suppression Act, s 5(2).  
98 Section 5(3).  
99 Section 25(1). 
100 Section 25(2). 
101 Section 5(5).   
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enforcement and intelligence officials.102 For example, New Zealand's only charges 
under the Terrorism Suppression Act were dropped after the Solicitor-General 
concluded that "the legislation is unnecessarily complex, incoherent and as a result 
almost impossible to apply" to the circumstances of the case.103  
In general, this ambiguity is found in other jurisdictions: the Canadian, New Zealand 
and Australian definitions of terrorism are based to a considerable extent on the 
United Kingdom's definition.104 However, despite widespread ambiguity, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council has emphasised the undesirability of such legislation, 
stating that "an imprecise definition of a crime can lead to the criminalisation of 
innocent conduct and to the broadening of proscribed conduct in judicial 
interpretation".105 As a result, individuals may be subject to the special powers the 
state has reserved for counterterrorism.106 
 
2 "Terrorist act" versus "foreign fighter" 
The breadth of the definition poses particular problems in the context of warrantless 
surveillance. The originating sources of the threat for which the legislation was 
enacted are the foreign terrorist fighter, violent extremism and radicalisation. 107  
However, the Bill did not define these terms, or use them in the substantive 
enactments. Hon Christopher Finlayson, Minister in Charge of the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service, stated that the Government considered the terms did not 
need a specific definition because definition of "terrorist act" in Section 5 of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act is adequate:108 
[w]e are targeting people by behaviour or intended behaviour, not by a label. The bill 
targets people who want to carry out a terrorist act... People who want to go and fight                                                         
102 Human Rights Commission Operation Eight: a human rights analysis (December 2013) at [79].  
103 David Collins QC Decision of the Solicitor-General in Relation to the Prosecution of People under 
the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 ("Operation 8") (Crown Law, 8 November 2007) at [8]. 
104 Douglas, above n 69, at 51–53.  
105United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism 
A/HRC/28/28 (19 December 2014) at [21].  
106 Kent Roach "Defining Terrorism: The Need for a Restrained Definition" in Craig Forcese and 
Nicole LaViolette (eds) The Ottawa Principles of Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism (Irwin Law, 
Toronto, 2008) 97 at 98; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 
87, at 40. 
107 Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill 2014 (1-2) (select committee report) at 1. 
108 Christopher Finlayson (National Party) speaking during the Second Reading (9 December 2014) 
702 NZPD 1207.  
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for the Islamic State or Iraq and the Levant are just the latest manifestations of the 
terrorist acts already envisaged by, and defined in, the Terrorism Suppression Act. 
 
However, the definition of "terrorist act" is overly broad for the purpose of countering 
foreign terrorist fighters. To understand this mismatch, we must first understand what 
a foreign terrorist fighter is. Resolution 2178 provides the definition as: 109   
individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for 
the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, 
terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in 
connection with armed conflict."  
One of the defining elements of a foreign terrorist fighter is that an individual leaves 
his or her country of origin.110 The current definition of "terrorist act" and trigger 
concept for warrantless surveillance, however, contains no distinction between 
suspected acts committed by the foreign terrorist fighter, and domestic threats. 
Domestic actors, while undeniably a threat to national security, are thereby implicated 
under legislation that is enacted to address a distinguishable threat.  
 
Some may argue the domestic threat of terrorism is an even greater impetus for 
warrantless surveillance than foreign terrorist fighters, as this threat has potential to 
cause harm at home. However, New Zealand's threat level remains at low: the threat 
of a terrorist attack is assessed at possible, but not expected. An unexpected threat 
does not justify unprecedented expansion of an intrusive State power that has the 
potential to apply very broadly.111 The Law Society stated in reference to the Bill that 
where legislation "which has such a potential to profoundly impact on human rights" 
is being considered, "public input and debate is essential".112 Therefore, if warrantless 
surveillance is to justifiably extend to the domestic sphere, it is imperative that debate 
and public consultation consider the full breadth of its implications.  
                                                         
109 SC Res 2178, above n 13, preamble at 2 (emphasis added).  
110See Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights "Foreign Fighters 
Under International Law" (October 2014) at 5; Orla Hennessy "The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters 
in Europe" (July 2012) International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at 2.  
111 Kennedy Graham, above n 15.  
112 New Zealand Law Society “Law Society urges reduction of terrorist fighter bill powers” (27 
November 2014) <https://www.lawsociety.org.nz>. 
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For now, introduction of a definition of "foreign fighter" and subsequent limitation of 
the power to these terms are imperative. For instance, legislators should return to 
Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) Number 42 introduced by Kennedy Graham of the 
Green party that failed to pass in the House following a 48 – 73 vote.113 This SOP 
proposed the insertion of a threefold purpose statement into each of the amending 
bills to provide clarity and interpretive instruction for the extent to which the new 
powers can be exercised. 114 In respect of the New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service, the SOP sought to introduce a section 41AA:115  
4IAA Purpose 
 
(1) The purpose of sections 4IA to 4IG is to ensure that New Zealand— 
a. meets its obligations under UN Security Council resolution 2178 of 24 
September 2014 to combat threats to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts including those perpetrated by foreign terrorist 
fighters; and 
b. ensures that such action by New Zealand remains consistent with its 
obligations under international human rights law, international refugee 
law, and international humanitarian law; and 
c. ensures that such action by New Zealand is not associated with any 
religion, nationality, or civilization. 
(2) Sections 4IA to 4IG apply to any person suspected of being a foreign terrorist 
fighter as defined in subsection (3), and to no other person. 
(3) Foreign terrorist fighter means a person who travels to a State other than their State 
of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or 
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of 
terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict. 
 
The requirements in subs (1) and the definition in subs (3) are taken verbatim from 
Resolution 2178.116 Subsection (1) provides interpretive instruction to the NZSIS and 
the judiciary that encourages a restrictive view of the powers available. Subsections 
(2) and (3) serve to streamline the Security Intelligence Service's powers to be                                                         
113 (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 1207. 
114 Kennedy Graham (Green Party) speaking In Committee (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 1207. 
115 Supplementary Order Paper 2014 (42) Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill (1-2) at 2.  
116 SC Res 2178, above n 13, at 2 and 1 respectively.  
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proportionate with the threat for which they were enacted. In the House, the proposed 
amendment was supported by the Labour Party as a "reasonable" effort to invoke 
"greater clarity and greater certainty" into definitions in the Bill. 117  Precision of 
legislative drafting is integral to adhering to the principle of legality, and this SOP 
provides a good vehicle through which New Zealand can improve its provision. 
 
3 Information retention after "expiry of an authorisation… if no warrant has 
been issued"  
 
A provision that attracted surprisingly little debate in the House was the data retention 
clause under s 4IE(9), given that the implications of its drafting potentially undermine 
several safeguards surrounding the exercise of warrantless surveillance authorisations. 
This section states that if no warrant is issued in relation to the authorisation, the 
Minister must ensure that any records resulting from activities undertaken pursuant to 
that authorisation are destroyed. However, records may be retained where they are 
relevant to the detection of activities prejudicial to security, or to the gathering of 
foreign intelligence essential to security.118 The decision to retain records must be 
referred to the Inspector-General for investigation.119 This retention clause provides a 
route through which the requirements for an authorisation may be systematically 
undermined.  
 
The provision must be broken down to understand the full extent of what it allows. 
The phrase "after the expiry of an authorisation" is vague as to the circumstances 
which amount to an expiry. An authorisation is valid for a period not exceeding 24 
hours and it logically follows that an authorisation will expire at the end of this time. 
However, it is not clear whether the provision applies to authorisations that are 
discontinued by the Minister or Commissioner. The point of discontinuance could 
arguably be interpreted as the point of expiry. This interpretation would be consistent 
with the power given to the Minister or Commissioner under s 4IE(2)(b) to direct the 
destruction of "any or all of the information collected" because the paragraph provides                                                         
117 Phil Goff (Labour Party) speaking In Committee (9 December 2014) 702 NZPD 1207. 
118 NZSIS Act, s 4IE(9).  
119 Section 41E(10). 
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a discretion to the Minister or Commissioner to direct the retention of information 
even where the authorisation has been discontinued. If this interpretation is correct, 
information may be retained even where an oversight authority has terminated the 
surveillance. 
 
The information retention provision further does not distinguish between 
circumstances in which an authorisation was not followed by a warrant application 
and those in which a warrant application was denied. If circumstances in which no 
warrant was applied for provide a valid foundation for the operation of the provision, 
information may be retained about an individual who turned out to be of no ongoing 
interest to the NZSIS. If the retention provision can be invoked where a warrant has 
been denied, this would allow for retention of information where the standard for a 
warrant has not been met in the minds of the Minister and Commissioner.   
 
Finally, the provision does not limit the ability to retain information gathered during 
authorisations deemed appropriate by oversight authorities. The Minister and 
Commissioner must determine whether an authorisation not followed by a warrant 
application was appropriate to be given and refer the matter to the Inspector-
General.120 Furthermore, the Inspector-General has a role of investigation where a 
warrant application is refused.121 This lack of specificity leaves open the possibility 
that information may be retained where oversight authorities have determined that the 
authorisation should not have been given.  
 
4 Retention on grounds of "security" 
 
A second issue with the retention clause is the breadth of the grounds upon which 
information may be retained.  
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression expressed concern over vague and unspecified notions of 
national security that have become an acceptable justification for surveillance:122 
                                                        
120 NZSIS Act, s 4IE(7). 
121 Section 4IE(8).  
122 Frank La Rue Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression A/HRC/23/40 (17 April 2013) at [60].  
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the use of an amorphous concept of national security to justify invasive limitations on 
the enjoyment of human rights is of serious concern. The concept is broadly defined 
and is thus vulnerable to manipulation by the State as a means of justifying actions 
that target vulnerable grounds such as human rights defenders, journalists or activists.  
 
As an illustration, the United Nations Human Rights Committee seventh periodic 
report of the United Kingdom stated that access to communications data should be 
"limited to the extent strictly necessary for the prosecution of the most serious 
crimes".123  
 
Therefore, the second issue with the information retention provision is the breadth of 
the clause, as it applies to information about activities that may be prejudicial to 
"security". Security is defined in section 2 of the NZSIS Act as:124  
 
(a) the protection of New Zealand from acts of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, 
whether or not they are directed from or intended to be committed within New 
Zealand: 
(b) the identification of foreign capabilities, intentions, or activities within or relating 
to New Zealand that impact on New Zealand's international well-being or 
economic well-being: 
(c)  the protection of New Zealand from activities within or relating to New Zealand 
that 
(i) are influenced by any foreign organisation or any foreign person; and  
(ii) are clandestine or deceptive, or threaten the safety of any person; and 
(iii) impact adversely on New Zealand's international well-being or economic 
well-being:  
(d) the prevention of any terrorist act and of any activity relating to the carrying out 
or facilitating of any terrorist act. 
 
It is clear that terrorism itself is only a subset of the breadth of the concept of security. 
In its submission on the Bill, the Law Society pointed to the fact that neither the 
                                                        
123 United Nations Human Rights Committee Concluding observations on the Seventh Periodic Report 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 (2014) at [24(d)]. 
124 Definition of "security" in s 2 of the NZSIS Act.  
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commission of an offence, nor a risk to life or safety feature in a provision regarding 
national security.125  
 
The generous scope of the retention clause is especially peculiar given that, following 
select committee recommendation, subs 4ID(1) was amended to provide that 
authorisations for warrantless surveillance must only be granted for counterterrorism 
activities. The purpose of this amendment was to reduce the scope power, which 
originally stood on grounds of security, and bring the provision within the 
counterterrorism intent of the Bill. 126 Further, the statutory mechanism to ensure 
deletion of information provides for a fine of up to $10,000 for knowing failure to 
delete records resulting from activities taken pursuant to an authorisation. This 
amount was increased from $1,000 following select committee recommendation in 
order to reflect the seriousness of the offence.127 Similarly, the Law Society supported 
this increase stating that a firmer safeguard would strengthen the obligation to put in 
place "appropriate policies and procedures to ensure the Bill is complied with".128  
 
Both of these increased safeguards are systematically undermined by the information 
retention clause. The clause circumvents the counterterrorism intent of the power by 
allowing any information collected to be retained on grounds of national security. It 
then undermines the safeguard against failure to delete records by legalising the 
retention of information that was never authorised to be collected.  
 
Australian legislation has no provision tailored specifically to Director-authorised 
warrants, but its general information retention clause provides that information not 
relevant to security must be destroyed.129 United Kingdom legislation requires that 
information is destroyed as soon as there are no longer any grounds for retaining it as 
necessary for any of the "authorised purposes" under a warrant, information necessary 
for carrying out the functions of the Secretary of State or Interception of 
                                                        
125 New Zealand Law Society "Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on 
the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill 2014" at [28].  
126 Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill 2014 (1-2) (select committee report) at 5.  
127 At 5. 
128New Zealand Law Society, above n 125, at [29].  
129  Section 31 Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act (Aus) requires information not 
relevant to performance of functions to be destroyed, one function of which is "to obtain, correlate and 
evaluate intelligence relevant to security" per s 17(1)(a).  
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Communications Commissioner or Tribunal, and where it is necessary for criminal 
prosecution.130  Canada's legislation allows the retention of information respecting 
activities that "may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the 
security of Canada".131 Evidently, these three jurisdictions allow for the retention of 
information on grounds that reflect those for which a warrant is granted and, in the 
case of the United Kingdom, for the practical operation of oversight and judicial 
mechanisms.  
 
To address the loophole in s 4IE(9), it is imperative that the information retention 
clause is restricted to information regarding the activities of foreign terrorist fighters 
only where an authorisation has been followed by a warrant or approved as reasonable 
by the Inspector-General. Thereby, the clause will facilitate the retention of records 
that were collected on a solid legal foundation.    
 
 B Citizens as Subjects of Rights and Justified Limits 
 
Resolution 2178 impleaded States to adhere to their international human rights 
obligations, stating that failure to comply with these obligations is one of the factors 
that contributes to increased radicalization and fosters a sense of impunity.132 Failure 
to restrict counterterrorism laws pose the risk that they will offend the principle of 
proportionality that governs the permissibility of restriction on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.133 As a result, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
has stated that "measures should be taken to ensure that any interference with the right 
to privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity."134 
 
The key right protected under New Zealand's domestic law that is implicated in 
warrantless surveillance powers is that in section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 ("NZBORA"): "[e]veryone has the right to be secure against                                                         
130 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (UK), s 15(3)-(4).  
131 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Can), s 21(1).  
132 SC Res 2178, above n 13, preamble at 2.  
133 Martin Scheinin, above n 88, at [26]; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, above n 87, at 24.   
134 United Nations Human Rights Committee, above n 123, at [24(a)].  
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unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, property, correspondence or 
otherwise."135  
 
Commentary to the draft article of the White Paper on the Bill of Rights noted that the 
phrase "whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise" was to 
ensure that the right applied "not only to acts of physical trespass but to any 
circumstances where statute intrusion on an individual's privacy is in this way 
unjustified". The commentary explicitly noted that the protection should extend to 
"electronic interception of private conversations, and other forms of surveillance".136  
 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which New 
Zealand is a party, states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence".137 The Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comment on the article, indicated that it applies to searches 
and "surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, 
telegraphic and other forms of communication, wire-tapping and recording of 
conversations." 138  The New Zealand Supreme Court in R v Hamed adopted this 
interpretation.139 
 
The Ministry of Justice provided legal advice to the Attorney-General for consistency 
of the Bill with the NZBORA. The report drew significantly on jurisprudence 
regarding warrantless surveillance powers available to the police under the Search and 
Surveillance Act and acknowledged safeguards that are not exclusively judicial, but 
include parliamentary and executive oversight. It concluded that the limitations "have 
the important objective of protecting national security, public order, safety and the 
rights of others" and are "rationally connected with this objective, proportional, and 
minimally impairing of rights."140                                                          
135 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21.  
136 Geoffrey Palmer "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984-1985] I AJHR A6 at 
[10.152]; Law Commission Search and Surveillance Powers NZLC R 79 at [2.15].  
137 ICCPR, above n 92, art 17.  
138 United Nations Human Rights Committee CCPR General Comment No 16: Article 17 (Right to 
Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection and 
Honour of Reputation (8 April 1988) at [8].  
139R v Hamed [2011] NZSC 101 at [18] per Elias CJ.  
140 Ministry of Justice Legal Advice: Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: 
Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill (Office of Legal Counsel, 12 November 2014) at [4]. 
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The Law Society criticised the Ministry's advice in regard to the passport denial 
provisions as focussing on justifying a restriction that is already permissible at law 
without considering the appropriateness of the length of the passport denial term, 
which was the issue on this point, and was not addressed or justified in the Ministry's 
advice.141 A similar argument can be made on the Ministry's analysis of warrantless 
surveillance powers. The advice laboured to justify the concept of warrantless powers 
in urgency as a legitimate exception to unreasonable search and seizure. However, the 
concept of warrantless surveillance in exceptional circumstances, at least for law 
enforcement officials, is well established. 142  The circumstances in which an 
authorisation may be given, oversight mechanisms, and length were not considered or 
justified by the advice.  
 
An example of how this analysis should have been undertaken is the Law 
Commission's report on warrantless surveillance powers for the police. The 
Commission established that warrantless surveillance powers in exceptional 
circumstances were available at law for law enforcement authorities. However, "the 
exceptional nature of such powers makes it essential to codify their existence and 
scope". 143 The report, therefore, considered three issues of statutory drafting: the 
offence for which surveillance without warrant ought to be available; the approval 
process that should precede or follow its use; and the maximum period over which 
surveillance without warrant should be conducted.144  These issues will be considered 
here in relation to warrantless surveillance powers for the NZSIS.   
 
The first issue is of the circumstances in which an authorisation can be given. 
Reminiscent of the principle of legality argument in the preceding section, there exists 
a mismatch between the threat that the Bill sought to address, and the breadth of the 
powers that have been enacted. Warrantless surveillance powers applicable to both 
domestic intentioned and foreign intentioned actors are disproportionate to the 
objective of countering foreign terrorist fighters. Where the power is exercised to                                                         
141 New Zealand Law Society, above n 125, at [9].  
142 Law Commission, above n 136, at [2.67].    
143At [5.5]. 
144 At [11.108].  
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authorise surveillance in circumstances other than that of a suspected foreign terrorist 
fighter, an individual's right to privacy and protection from unreasonable search and 
seizure will be unjustifiably implicated.  
 
The next issue is the extent to which an approval process should be provided. On this 
issue, legislative review should consider the inconsistencies between New Zealand 
and other Commonwealth nations as a concern that New Zealand has expanded its 
powers to an unjustifiable extent. Currently, New Zealand's statute allows the 
Director-General to make an authorisation and then immediately inform the Minister, 
Commissioner and Inspector-General who may discontinue the surveillance. 145 In 
comparison, Canada adheres to the strict judicial warrant procedure.146 Australia's 
precedent requires a warrant application to be made before surveillance can be 
internally authorised. 147 The United Kingdom requires urgent authorisation to be 
made by the Secretary of State, who is the actor that approves warrants in the ordinary 
course of affairs.148 Each of these jurisdictions requires the warrant process to have 
progressed further before an emergency warrant can be granted, if at all.  
 
The final issue is the maximum period for which the emergency use of surveillance 
should be permitted. The present authorisation extends for 24 hours.149 Canada allows 
for no emergency authorisation.150 Australia's legislation provides for 48 hours, but 
recall that a warrant application must already have been made, therefore, the period 
for which the emergency warrant stands is dependent only on the Minister's 
consideration and issuance of a warrant. 151 The United Kingdom allows for five 
working days, but this provision is tailored to an emergency situation in which the 
Secretary of State is not physically available to sign the warrant, but will still 
personally authorise the surveillance activity.152  
 
                                                        
145 NZSIS Act, s 4IE(2).  
146 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Can), s 21(1). 
147 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act (Aus), s 29(1)(a). 
148 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (UK), ss 7(2)(a), 42(1) and 44(2).   
149 NZSIS Act 4ID(3).   
150 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Can), s 21(1). 
151 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act (Aus), ss 29(1)(a) and 29(2).  
152 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (UK), ss 9(6), 7(2)(a), 42(1) and 44(2).   
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There is a mismatch between New Zealand's legislation and both its overseas 
counterparts and its obligations to protect the human rights of its citizens. To amend 
these issues, New Zealand's Privacy Commissioner would strengthen the obligation to 
notify the Minister and Commissioner to require the application for a warrant to be 
made within 12 hours. Under this approach, the surveillance would be positively 
authorised by the Minister and Commissioner, rather than being subject to 
discontinuance. 153  This recommendation is still considerably weaker than our 
Commonwealth counterparts, but bolsters the support for a more restrictive view of 
surveillance in urgent situations.  
 
An alternative, and preferable, amendment would be to have the Minister and or 
Commissioner give the authorisation, pending a 12-hour window in which a warrant 
application must be made. If the Director is able to assess whether the warrant 
threshold is met and subsequently notify the Minister and Commissioner, there does 
not seem to be any reason not to require the Director to immediately notify the 
Minister and Commissioner of the relevant evidence and have these authorities issue 
an authorisation, similar to the United Kingdom requirement. The statement by the 
Law Commission in regard to police warrantless surveillance powers that "if there is 
time to obtain internal approval then there ought to be sufficient time to obtain a 
telewarrant" supports this conclusion. 154  This formulation would mean that an 
external oversight authority gives the authorisation itself.  
 
V Conclusion  
The latest and most recent manifestation of the terrorist threat is that of the foreign 
terrorist fighter. As a result of combined international pressure and increase of the 
domestic threat level at home, and in order to increase domestic capacity to respond to 
these threats, New Zealand has enacted emergency powers for the NZSIS. The Bill 
introduced the ability to conduct warrantless surveillance for 24 hours where there is 
an actual, potential or suspected terrorist act or facilitation of a terrorist act. The Bill 
was rushed through Parliament under urgency, resulting in significant short-cuts in 
                                                        
153 Privacy Commissioner, above n 8, at 3.  
154 Law Commission, above n 136, at [11.112]. 
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terms of public and external consultation. As a result, the Bill presents several 
shortcomings.  
The Office of Prime Minister and Cabinet provided incomplete information to the 
Select Committee that did not emphasise the stark differences between the provisions 
of Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand in the context of emergency 
surveillance. Whereas privacy rights are upheld by the warrant procedure, New 
Zealand has taken a significant step further than our Commonwealth partners in 
eroding this right.  
The use of the term "terrorist act" offends the principle of legality. The definition 
itself is vague, with the potential to be applied very broadly. Its breadth does not 
distinguish between domestic threats and foreign terrorist fighters, thereby extending 
the power of warrantless surveillance over actors that did not and do not present a 
threat large enough to justify intrusive state powers. The enactment also contains an 
information retention clause that creates a significant loophole in the legislation. 
The Ministry of Justice's advice on consistency of the Bill with NZBORA provided 
did not acknowledge the true complexities of the power. While in the context of 
police powers warranted searches have been found to be reasonable by the Courts, 
discussion of the shape and scope of the newly enacted powers and their impact on 
unreasonable search and seizure remained unaddressed and unjustified.  
However, in accordance with s 21 of the Intelligence and Security Committee Act 
1996, a review of the intelligence and security agencies, the legislation governing 
them, and their oversight legislation must have been commenced before 30 June 
2015.155 In the security intelligence context, in which outside debate is precluded by 
redactions and withheld information, the review will provide a vital forum for deeper 
analysis of the issues that have been raised in this paper and others, including recourse 
for individuals subject to surveillance, guidance to the courts, the efficacy of the 
Inspector-General as an oversight mechanism and, most importantly, the necessity of 
warrantless surveillance powers at all in the security intelligence context.  
 
                                                        
155 Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996, s 21(1). 
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VI  Appendix  
 
 Intelligence Warrant 
Pre-existing warrant procedure.  
Visual Surveillance Warrant: 
Enacted by NZSISA Act 2014.   
Warrantless authorisations 
Enacted by NZSISA Act 2014.  
Power 
Authorised 
Intercept or seize any 
communication, document or thing 
not otherwise lawfully obtainable 
by the person, or undertake 
electronic tracking.156  
 
Visual surveillance.157  Powers as authorised under an 
intelligence warrant or visual 
surveillance warrant.158  
Authorising 
actor 
Minister and the Commissioner 
jointly 159  on application from 
Director or acting Director. 160 
Minister and Commissioner 
jointly 161  on application from 
Director or acting Director. 162 
Director (or person for the time 
being acting as the Director).163  
 
Activity sought 
to be detected 
Necessary for the detection of 
activities prejudicial to security.164 
 
Necessary for the detection, 
investigation, or prevention or 
any actual, potential or 
suspected terrorist act or 
facilitation of a terrorist act.165 
 
Necessary for the detection, 
investigation or prevention of any 
actual, potential, or suspected 
terrorist act or facilitation of a 
terrorist act.166   
 
 
Grounds for 
authorisation 
Section 4A(3)167 
(d) The value of the information 
sought justifies the particular 
Section 4IB(3)168  
(b) The value of the information 
sought justifies surveillance. 
Section 4ID(1)169 
(b) In the case of an intelligence 
warrant, the conditions in                                                         
156 NZSIS Act, s 4A(1).  
157 Section 4IB(1).  
158 Section 4ID(2) 
159 Section 4A(1).  
160 Section 4A(4).  
161 Section 4IB(1). 
162 Section 4IB(5).  
163Section 4ID(1). 
164 Section 4A(3)(a). 
165 Section 4IB(3)(a). 
166 Section 4ID(1)(a). 
167 Section 4A(3). 
168 Section 4IB(3). 
169 Section 4ID(1). 
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or warrant surveillance; and 
(e) The information is not likely to 
be obtained by other means; 
and 
(f) Communication sought is not 
privileged under the Evidence 
Act 2006 or any rule of law. 
(c) The information is not likely 
to be obtained by any other 
means; and  
(d) Recording of activities 
sought is not privileged 
under the Evidence Act 
2006 or any rule of law.  
4A(3)(b) to (d) apply; or in 
the case of a visual 
surveillance warrant, the 
conditions in 41B(3)(b) to (d) 
apply. 
(c) That obtaining a warrant is in 
time is impracticable in the 
circumstances and delay is 
likely to result in loss of 
intelligence.  
Re-application Section 4C170 
(1): Valid for a period not 
exceeding 12 months.   
(2) The expiry of an intelligence 
warrant does not prevent a 
subsequent application for warrant 
in respect of the same subject 
matter.  
The same provisions as apply in 
s 4C apply to visual surveillance 
warrants.171 
An authorisation is valid for a 
period not exceeding 24 hours.172 
On expiry of an authorisation, no 
further application may be made in 
respect of the same subject 
matter.173  
 
Table 1. Legislative requirements for intelligence warrants, visual surveillance 
warrants, and surveillance in situations of emergency or urgency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
170 NZSIS Act, s 4C.   
171 Section 4IC(1)(c).   
172 Section 4ID(3).  
173 Section 4ID(4).  
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